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Introduction 
 
In 1944 Karl Polanyi published a work that would become a milestone in 20th-century 
social science, The Great Transformation. He was among the first to explain the economic 
and political catastrophe of the inter-war period as the final stage of a long-term process 
that reigned in Western Europe (and the United States) in the wake of the Napoleonic 
wars, market liberalism. Polanyi considered those ‘one hundred years’ to be a coherent 
period covering the rise and fall of 19th-century civilization. 
Polanyi characterized the 19th-century civilization that was destined to die with the 
Great Depression of the 20th century by four institutions: the balance-of-power system, 
the gold standard, the self-regulating market and the liberal state. Of these institutions, 
Polanyi asserts that the gold standard was the only one to survive both the Long 
Depression (previously known as the Great Depression) of 1873-1886 and the Great War. 
However, its ultimate failure delivered the death blow for market liberalism and, in some 
places, also swept liberal democracy away with it. The final part of Polanyi’s book gives 
a historical account of this process.  
However, early on in the book, Polanyi warns us that he is not conducting historical 
research: «what we are searching for is not a convincing sequence of outstanding events, 
but an explanation of their trend in terms of human institutions»1. This statement should 
be understood as a declaration of intent; Polanyi’s analysis was not limited to a single 
subject, such as history or economics, and he made this very clear by saying «we shall 
encroach upon the field of several disciplines in the pursuit of a single aim»2. 
This paper focuses on the causal chain Polanyi established in his work, which links the 
gold standard with deflation and the failure of democracy during the inter-war period. It 
examines to what extent the three-step causal connection was accurate, or not. In quite a 
similar way to Polanyi, we have searched for answers in several disciplines, in particular, 
economic and sociological history. First, we present Polanyi’s thesis on the crisis of 
liberalism in the 1920s and 1930s. We then study the different parts of his causal link, 
highlighting the possible effect of deflation on the rise of fascism in Europe. We use some 
reference works in economic history and sociology concerning the inter-war period to 
evaluate Polanyi’s thesis, in addition to statistics reflecting the dynamics of price 
movements in the inter-war years, which also allow us to present evidence of a rupture 
with the laissez-faire economy in Europe, which Karl Polanyi seems to have overlooked. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 K. POLANYI, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston, Beacon 
Press, 2001 [1957], p. 4. 
2 Ibidem. 
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The gold standard, deflation and the failure of liberalism in The Great Transformation 
 
Between the First World War and the Second World War, everything referred to by 
Polanyi as ‘the energies of history’ were brought into play in Europe. Although the war 
of 1914 had brought the 19th-century world to an end, there were many who were 
convinced that only by reproducing the same pre-war liberal system (based on the self-
regulating market economy) could the continent regain peace and prosperity. However, 
many of the conditions that had made the system work in the 19th century were absent 
after the war on a continent where universal suffrage tended to be the rule and not the 
exception. The result was a weak economic equilibrium surrounded by dangerous non-
democratic alternatives, from communism in the Soviet Union to fascism in Italy. The 
Great Depression broke that equilibrium by eroding the liberal model, both economic and 
political. Democracies with a long liberal tradition (Britain and the United States) could 
survive, whereas other countries embraced radical solutions as an alternative to free 
markets. Consequently, the 1930s marked the end of the liberal model and ushered in the 
‘great transformation’ expressed in the title, which Polanyi himself summarized as 
Britain’s withdrawal from the gold standard, the five-year plans in the USSR, the New 
Deal in the United States, and Nazism in Germany. In his opinion, some of these ruptures 
with the principles of the liberal economic model (in particular, naturally, Nazism) led to 
the outbreak of World War II. 
What did Polanyi believe to be the main cause of the failure of the self-regulating 
market economy during the first post-war? From the very beginning the author gives us 
a clear indication: the gold standard; in fact, he says that «its fall was the proximate cause 
of the catastrophe»3. The beginning of the second chapter of his book reinforces this idea 
by pointing out the «breakdown of the international gold standard’ as the factor behind 
both ‘the disintegration of world economy which started at the turn of the century and the 
transformation of a whole civilization in the thirties»4. Polanyi explains the former 
through the narrow link between the international monetary network (gold standard) and 
the new international order that emerged in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars and lasted 
until 1914, known as the Pax Britannica. Since the gold standard was crucial for the 
European political equilibrium through free trade, a landmark of the traditional (liberal) 
world economy, as soon as gold was used for the purposes of protectionism and colonial 
expansion, a perversion of the model that Polanyi first attributes to Germany, the Hundred 
Years’ Peace was bound to end. 
The latter process, the so-called great transformation, conveys the fundamental 
explanation of Polanyi’s thesis. In the two decades that followed World War I, the failed 
attempt to restore the international monetary system was unable to make the balance of 
power among nations work for peace. In the 1920s there was an «almost universal 
conviction that only the reestablishment of the pre-1914 system … could restore peace 
and prosperity»5. And this implied the reconstruction of the gold standard model as the 
best way to promote free trade among nations. In short, the impossibility of doing so led 
to the political and economic transformation of the 1930s. Again, the role of gold standard 
was a key element in the outcome. Polanyi already describes the sequence of facts in his 
second chapter. Tied to an informal compromise with the League of Nations and the 
dominant financial centres (Wall Street and the City of London), nations worldwide made 
                                               
3 Ivi, p. 3. 
4 Ivi, p. 21. 
5 Ivi, p. 23. 
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an effort to keep their currency stable, but this became an impossible task without a free 
trade policy. Finally, when the gold standard collapsed, so did the institutions devoted to 
promoting a world of stable currencies. Polanyi mentions the League of Nations and the 
international haute finance6. In the end, the economic crisis affected the liberal political 
system by turning democracies into totalitarian dictatorships, where the free market was 
replaced by the role of authoritarian states. 
These ideas are further developed in the last chapters of the book. Chapter 16 contains 
a detailed dissertation by Polanyi on the relationship between the gold standard and 
central banks. In the 19th century (and even as far as 1914), the priority given to the gold 
standard and free trade over the needs of domestic economies meant that many countries 
resorted to deflation in order to avoid depreciation of their currencies. According to 
Polanyi, deflation was not a huge problem in terms of income and unemployment thanks 
to the supply of internal credit by independent central banks. Nonetheless, the aim of 
promoting exports to prevent withdrawals of gold reserves implied a restrictive monetary 
policy with the recurring result of the liquidation of the least efficient firms and growing 
unemployment. Polanyi’s conclusion regarding the whole situation stresses the negative 
effects over the positive ones: «again and again a complete disorganization of business 
and consequent mass unemployment, is the most powerful of all the indictments of the 
gold standard»7. 
The gold standard in the 19th century represented the difficulties of separating 
economics from politics, the «outstanding characteristic of market society» in Polanyi’s 
words8. The concept of money as a commodity, a mere means of exchange, predominated 
for over a century, but in the early 20th century the concept of money as purchasing power 
began to gain ground, particularly after the breakdown of the gold standard system in 
1914.  The belief held in the twenties that the gold standard was the «precondition of a 
return to stability and prosperity»9, i.e. to a pre-war world, allowed central bankers to 
impose their deflationary measures in order to keep exchange rates stable. When the crisis 
came in 1929, the chaos in world trade changed the priority from foreign stability to 
internal stability. In the end this change implied that monetary policy in the hands of 
central banks was increasingly becoming a political issue. While levels of deflation were 
quite low (2-3 per cent), there was no need to manage the currency, and money as a 
commodity along with the automatic adjustment mechanism of the gold standard 
remained undisputed. But when prices fell by ten per cent or even more, threatening 
people’s purchasing power, central banks were forced to implement policies that involved 
monetary intervention against the principles of the gold standard. Polanyi considers this 
issue (the managing of the national currency) to be the centre of the conflict between 
economic classes in the thirties, and certainly one of the basic causes «in the growth of 
the antidemocratic movement»10. 
In Polanyi’s view, what happened in the monetary field during the Great Depression 
took with it all that was left of the world of the self-regulating market. Britain’s 
withdrawal from the gold standard in 1931, followed by the United States two years later, 
marked the end of an era: «final failure of the gold standard was the final failure of market 
                                               
6 Ivi, p. 29. 
7 Ivi, p. 204. 
8 Ibidem. 
9 Ivi, p. 208. 
10 Ivi, p. 207. 
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economy»11. And its place was taken by «forces of charismatic leadership and autarkist 
isolationism»12, not only in economics but also in politics. Those two facts (the end of 
market economy, and its replacement by authoritarian solutions) were very closely 
connected. Part three of The Great Transformation goes deeper into these topics. 
Being part of the international monetary system known as the gold standard usually 
meant that internal wages and prices could not rise steadily without damaging exports. In 
the first decade after World War I, a thick line separated groups who demanded ‘treasury 
inflation’ (Polanyi identifies trade unions and ‘labour’ parties, allied with the labour 
movement) from those who opposed any intervention of that kind from central bankers 
(middle-class and conservative parties). Similarly, employers and employees were on 
opposing sides with regard to budget and public expenditure. But interventionism was not 
merely a matter of right and left-wing politics. Polanyi explains that situation experienced 
by Britain and Germany in 1931, Belgium and France in 1926, and Austria in 1923 was 
similar: labour parties losing elections after sacrificing the budget for the benefit of the 
currency. Taking Britain in 1931 and Léon Blum’s unsuccessful French ‘New Deal’ of 
1936 as examples, Polanyi concludes that the effects on popular policies of defending the 
currency under gold standard rules was crippling. Except for the United States, whose 
economy was not dependent on foreign trade, and Britain, whose large share of world 
trade enabled it to shift «the burden of the gold standard largely to other shoulders»13, 
other countries (Germany, France, Belgium and Austria) were tied to the gold value of 
their currencies, which strongly restricted any trade union influence on wages. 
Polanyi blames the League of Nations and specially the Gold Delegation of the 
Financial Committee in Geneva for expanding a deflationist policy in the world of the 
first post-war or inter-war period. More or less in line with the same idea he develops in 
his criticism of the free market in Victorian England, Polanyi sees the aim of restoring 
currency stability and free exchange as taking priority over free markets and free 
governments, «the two pillars of liberal capitalism»14.  Thus, the ‘deflationary 
governments’ were forced by Geneva to take any measure that was needed to stabilize the 
currency, even though this went against the liberal ideal of non-intervention in the 
markets. In 1932, when exchange rate stability proved to be a chimera, the Report of the 
Gold Delegation, Polanyi notes, abandoned its obsession with deflation. Free markets 
were never achieved, but at the expense of free governments. In the end, the liberalism 
represented by all the defenders of the gold standard facilitated the rise of fascism. 
Polanyi’s conclusion leaves little doubt: «The stubbornness with which economic liberals, 
for a critical decade, had, in the service of deflationary policies, supported authoritarian 
interventionism, merely resulted in a decisive weakening of the democratic forces which 
might otherwise have averted the fascist catastrophe»15. 
In Polanyi’s mind the process that brought fascists to power was a consequence of the 
collapse of the market system between the wars as much as it was the result of the triumph 
of socialism in Russia. Labour parties in continental Europe were inspired by this to turn 
their desire to reform capitalism into a more revolutionary approach. When those parties 
gained parliamentary weight in the twenties, capitalists begun to fear for their property 
rights. Polanyi points out that while socialism was seen by workers as the natural solution 
                                               
11 Ivi, p. 209. 
12 Ibidem. 
13 Ivi, p. 238. 
14 Ivi, p. 241. 
15 Ivi, p. 242. 
 The gold standard, deflation and…  117 
 
for the subordination of markets to the political community, for the economic system it 
meant: 
 
a radical departure from the immediate past, insofar as with the attempt to make 
private money gains the general incentive to productive activities, and does not 
acknowledge the right of private individuals to dispose of the main instruments of 
production16. 
 
The inevitable clash of interests between classes (employers versus employees) took a 
dramatic twist when the latter used democracy to intervene in business in what Polanyi 
saw as ‘warfare against the industrial system’ (2001: 244), while the former encouraged 
the population to blame their freely elected governments for the economic crisis. In a 
context of widespread fear, fascists emerged all over Europe (from Finland to Spain) with 
easy solutions to complex problems. 
Chapter 20 asserts that there was a necessary link between the failure of liberal 
capitalism and the rise of fascism in Europe. In fact, Polanyi discredits any other 
interpretation:  
 
The appearance of such a movement […] should never have been ascribed to local 
causes, national mentalities, or historical backgrounds as was so consistently done 
by contemporaries. Fascism had as little to do with the Great War as with the 
Versailles Treaty, with Junker militarism as with the Italian temperament. 
 
Therefore, the success of fascism in the thirties, illustrated by the case of Germany in 
1932, was a product of an objective situation (the «institutional deadlock» of free market 
societies) and had little to do even with the strength of the movement itself. In Roaring 
Twenties Europe, nationalism and counterrevolution served fascism on its road to power, 
especially in the defeated countries of the Great War. Nevertheless, Polanyi regards the 
connection with those post-war tendencies as accidental, a «case of symbiosis between 
movements of independent origin»17. The only factor that determined the political 
strength of fascism was the difference in the economic situation before and after 1929. 
While the market system functioned, whether with difficulties (1917–1923) or without 
them (1924–1929), fascists had to wait for their opportunity, but when the Great 
Depression hit the liberal system so brutally, that opportunity was turned into a reality in 
only a few short years. 
Unsurprisingly, when Polanyi lists the events that evidenced the temporary restoration 
of market capitalism between 1924 and 1929, the last (but not least) is once more the gold 
standard ruling the world «from Moscow to Lisbon»18. In that sense, the monetary system 
seemed to be the anchor of the entire international economy in the twenties, and the crack 
in Wall Street was the storm that swept it away. Barely four years later, with the gold 
standard «put out of action by its Anglo-Saxon creators»19, world trade and capital flows 
collapsed, foreign debts were repudiated, and many economic turbulences became 
political and military issues:  
 
A Wall Street slump grew to huge dimensions and was followed by Great Britain’s 
                                               
16 Ibidem. 
17 Ivi, p. 250. 
18 Ivi, p. 252. 
19 Ibidem. 
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decision to go off gold and, another two years later, by a similar move on the part of 
the United States. Concurrently, the Disarmament Conference ceased to meet, and, 
in 1933, Germany left the League of Nations20. 
 
Polanyi’s reasoning is even taken a step further when he describes Germany under the 
Nazis as the paradigmatic example of the great transformation caused by the failure of 
liberal capitalism. Germany broke free from the economic international system to the 
same extent that it repudiated any political commitment or obligation with other nations. 
Unhindered by the sacrifice imposed by orthodox economics, the Nazis could fulfil their 
plans through autarchy, whereas Great Britain hindered economic recovery and 
rearmament due to its blind faith in «the principles of stable exchanges and sound 
currency»21. Even more, Polanyi says that Britain’s approval of Czechoslovakia handing 
over its gold reserves to Germany in 1938 (after the Munich Agreement) was not a sign 
of appeasement but of «homage to the spirit of the gold standard, which continued to 
govern the outlook of the leading men of the City of London on strategic as well as on 
political matters»22. Halifax and Chamberlain believed that peace depended on the 
restoration of world trade through some new version of the gold standard system. 
Polanyi’s opinion on this subject is conclusive: «England’s military unpreparedness was 
mainly the result of her adherence to gold standard economics»23. 
Having presented Polanyi’s thesis, our goal in the next chapters is to evaluate it through 
two core questions. The first is the role of the gold standard during the inter-war period. 
To what extent was it a determining factor in the crisis of the market system? The second 
question arises directly from the previous one: was fascism a result of the malfunctioning 
of the gold standard model? Other collateral questions taken from Polanyi’s statements 
inevitably appear during the course of our research. For example, did deflation cause 
greater social and economic distress than that caused by inflation in Europe? Or, can we 
explain the rise of fascism purely in terms of the economic situation, disregarding other 
factors, as Polanyi suggests? In order to answer these questions, we present statistical 
evidence and, more importantly, we review important literature concerning three issues: 
the gold standard after 1914, the economic situation in Europe during the 1920s, and the 
roots of fascism. Economic history, political history and sociology will provide enough 
clues to enable us to combine these three aspects and provide an answer to our questions. 
 
 
The gold standard in the inter-war period 
 
As we have observed, Polanyi attributes to the gold standard a crucial role in the Great 
Depression and, as a consequence, the failure of the self-regulating market system. In this 
assertion, he shared the explanation given by John Maynard Keynes to the crisis in the 
early thirties, though their interpretation differed in some details, as we will mention 
later24. 
Specialists in monetary issues at the time of the Great Depression confirm a great 
                                               
20 Ibidem. 
21 Ivi, p. 253. 
22 Ivi, p. 254. 
23 Ibidem. 
24 Cfr. G. BECCHIO, Karl Polanyi fra Marx, Keynes e Hayek: visione e analisi, in «Studi e Note di 
Economia», 2, 2006, pp. 141-154. 
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consensus among economists in considering the gold standard «a key element – if not the 
key element – in the collapse of the world economy» during the thirties. In any event, 
some clarifications are required. It was not a matter of the monetary system causing the 
crisis, but rather of helping it to convert an «unexceptional downturn … into the Great 
Depression»25. Why were wrong policies continued when it was clear that they were 
aggravating the contraction? Their argument is that the gold standard was the ideological 
pillar of central bankers and politicians in Europe and the United States, precisely one of 
Polanyi’s main ideas back in the 1940s: the commitment of the dominant classes to what 
he called the «obsolete market mentality» (interestingly enough, Barry Eichengreen and 
Peter Temin use the same word: mentality) was materialized through the gold standard, 
so that even when the boat was sinking they stuck to it26. Ironically, Polanyi is an absent 
reference in their paper27. 
From a different perspective, agreement with Polanyi’s thought lies in a causal link 
between the economic slump of 1929-1933 and the failure of the gold standard. On the 
contrary, it denies the responsibility of the gold-backed monetary system for the Great 
Depression28. More interestingly, this perspective reveals a crucial issue: by no means 
was gold standard the same mechanism that operated prior to 1914.  First of all, few 
countries returned to the pre-war (coin) gold standard. Second, the «servomechanisms» 
that were supposed to adjust internal economies to the necessities of a stable currency 
were rarely implemented during the inter-war period. Central banks, under important 
political pressures, decided not to follow the «rules of the game» of insulating domestic 
economies from gold inflows, by sterilizing the monetary effects on internal credit, prices 
and wages. Indeed, the post-1914 gold standard «depended upon the financiers, central 
bankers and politicians [who] … only imperfectly understood the system they 
operated»29.  
A classic work in economic history on the economy of the inter-war period by Derek 
Aldcroft seems to be in line with Drummond’s conclusions30. In Aldcroft’s view, the post-
war economic environment had changed so much that it became an impossible task «to 
recreate a viable gold standard in the 1920s». Consequently, he regards the monetary 
system reconstructed in the twenties «was but a pale reflection of the old». The wrong 
stabilization process ended up with undervalued or overvalued parities in the majority of 
countries, a starting problem with no subsequent solution, given that everybody was 
                                               
25 B. EICHENGREEN, P. TEMIN, The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, in «Contemporary European 
History», 9, 2, 2000, p. 195. 
26 This is not the only idea in the paper to recall those of The Great Transformation. In fact, the main 
differences between the two are apparently found in the terms they use to describe this ‘mentality’. While 
Polanyi insists on calling it liberal(ism), Eichengreen and Temin only use the word liberal on one occasion 
(when referring to Sir Herbert Samuel of the Royal Commission on the (British) Coal Industry). Rather, 
they refer to those elites supporting the gold standard the term coined by Keynes the «investing class». And 
the recurrent “self-regulating” market that was behind the gold standard mentality in Polanyi becomes the 
«self-correcting powers» in the world economy between the two wars.  
27 Fifteen years later, in his book about the similarities between the Great Depression and the Great 
Recession, Eichengreen did mention Karl Polanyi among the scholars whose lessons of the Great 
Depression had some influence on the decisions taken in 2007-08. B. EICHENGREEN, Hall of mirrors, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 378. 
28 I.M. DRUMMOND, The gold standard and the international monetary system, 1900-1939, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Education, 1987. 
29 Ivi, p. 56. 
30 D. ALDCROFT, From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919-1929, Oakland, University of California Press, 
1981[1977]. 
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reluctant to adjust them later on. The main reason was that «few countries were prepared 
to sacrifice the stability of their domestic economies for external equilibrium»31. On this 
particular issue, Aldcroft agrees with Polanyi that the fear of unemployment was a basic 
factor behind the priority given to domestic monetary objectives over the stabilization of 
exchange rates.   
These relevant changes had already been noticed by Polanyi in his book, although 
certain difficulties arise when following his argument. Naturally, he was aware of the 
interventionism displayed by central banks in the inter-war period, but such interference 
with the servomechanisms of the system did not seem to concern him at all. On the 
contrary, he saw management of the currency by central banks through the mechanism of 
supplying credit as «part of the rules of the game under which the gold standard was 
supposed to function»32. Therefore, Polanyi sees practically no differences before and 
after 1914, ignoring that the post-war international monetary system was commonly 
called the «gold bullion standard» for good reason33. As a consequence, this position 
allows him to regard the return to gold in the 1920s as perfectly compatible with the self-
regulating market system, extending the pre-war model of the gold standard as far as 
1930. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the international monetary system after 1914 
could replace the 19th-century world of the self-regulating market. While the Great War 
had resulted in a rupture with the gold standard system as it had functioned previously, 
the 1920s could not be seen as a return to 1913, mainly because the world, and Europe 
specifically, had so many unresolved problems (inflation, weak budgets, territorial 
arrangements and political instability, among others) to pretend that nothing had 
changed34. 
Another discrepancy arises with periodization. While Polanyi seems to concentrate on 
the effects of monetary intervention in the 1930s, Aldcroft sees that it was already chronic 
in the 1920s, even in the United States when, in 1928–1929, the Federal Reserve 
«favoured domestic over external objectives»35. Polanyi’s reasoning is that with deflation 
levels at around three per cent, there was no need to manipulate the currency to stay in 
gold. But huge deflation soon demanded a degree of intervention from central banks that 
was far from the ideal of self-regulation; in fact, «monetary policy was thereby drawn 
into the sphere of politics»36. According to Polanyi, that situation took place only after 
the shock of 1929, showing that bankers were not sufficiently qualified to stabilize their 
national currencies under the combination of dire straits and gold standard rules. In turn, 
it opened up a decade in which internal conflicts between economic classes forced 
politicians to leave the gold standard. He saw Britain’s relinquishment in September 1931 
as «the final failure of market economy»37.  
Last but not least, it is interesting to evaluate Polanyi’s conclusions about the negative 
consequences of whether to pursue an orthodox monetary policy. For Polanyi there was 
little doubt that deflation was the evil. In reference to the Gold Delegation of the League 
of Nations (Geneva), an institution he says to have put ‘deflationary governments’ in 
power, Polanyi asserts: 
                                               
31 Ivi, pp. 167-168, and 172. 
32 K. POLANYI, op. cit., p. 206. 
33 I.M. DRUMMOND, op. cit., p. 34. 
34 Ivi, p. 31. 
35 D. ALDCROFT, op. cit., p. 179. 
36 K. POLANYI, op. cit., p. 207. 
37 Ivi, p. 209. 
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In 1932 the Report of the Gold Delegation of the League of Nations declared that 
with the return of the exchange uncertainty the main monetary achievement of the 
past decade had been eliminated. What the report did not say was that in the course 
of these vain deflationary efforts free markets had not been restored though free 
governments had been sacrificed38. 
 
On the other hand, inflation was only a spectre that served the liberals’ purpose of 
imposing the gold standard and deflationist policies. Polanyi recalls first how «hundreds 
of millions of people had been afflicted by the scourge of inflation»39 in the 1920s; later 
in the book he points out how that «charge of inflationism became an effective argument 
against democratic legislatures»40. 
Interestingly, his position regarding inflation was not the same in the 1930s. In a text 
written in 1932 for the Austrian economic and political magazine Der Österreichische 
Volkswirt, he claimed that several left-wing governments in Europe (Britain, Belgium, 
France and even Germany) were removed from power due to currency mismatches that 
caused inflation41. In his 1930s’ interpretation of the Great Depression, Polanyi stressed 
the major role inflation played in the crisis, whereas Keynes thought the same role to be 
«surprisingly modest». Moreover, Polanyi was critical of Keynes’ solutions to the crisis 
involving inflationary policies42. Ten years later, Polanyi seemed to see things differently, 
and he considered inflation the main enemy economic liberals found in their pursuit of 
restoring a self-regulating economy.  
What was more damaging during the inter-war period, deflation or inflation? Deflation 
hit several countries in the twenties, especially in the process of macro-economic 
stabilization prior to their return to gold standard: Sweden between 1920 and 1922 
(‘severe’), Norway and Denmark between 1925 and 1928 (‘sharp’) and Britain until 1925 
(‘intermittent’), all the result of an overvalued currency. The Scandinavian countries, 
particularly Sweden, were able to adjust their economies to the requirements of external 
stability, but in any event, devaluation was always preferred to further internal deflation. 
Britain, through the management of interest rates by the Bank of England, was a 
paradigmatic case in this respect43.  
Would all these nations have performed better if they had implemented a monetary 
policy independent from the restrictions imposed by the gold standard? Polanyi tends to 
suggest they would have, as we have seen previously. Aldcroft admits that deflation 
prevented these economies from realizing their «full growth potential». Nonetheless, he 
considered an even worse alternative. Thus, the German hyperinflation of the early 
twenties left the figures for real income, production and exports so far below pre-war 
levels that they could not, he states «be matched by any of the countries which carried out 
a deflationary policy». Between 1919 and 1923, years of «turmoil, poverty, starvation and 
tension» conditioned the lives of Germans in such a way that it made the country 
dependent on borrowing abroad heavily by the late twenties. And despite the flight of 
foreign capital from Germany that accompanied the slump of late 1929, the government 
                                               
38 Ivi, p. 242. 
39 Ivi, p. 148. 
40 Ivi, p. 235. 
41 K. POLANYI, Wirtschaft un Demokratie, in «Der Österreichische Volkswirt», 13-14, 1932, pp. 301-303. 
42 G. BECCHIO, op.cit., pp. 144-145. 
43 D. ALDCROFT, op. cit., p. 52. 
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rejected any expansionary policy because of the long shadow of inflation44. 
Given that Polanyi’s logical sequence began with the return to gold after the war and 
ended with the coming of fascists to power, the German case is, by no means, irrelevant, 
and it is somewhat controversial. After the destruction of the pre-war German currency 
and the creation of a new one (Retenmark), Germany was forced to restore the pre-war 
parity as part of the American financial assistance provided in 1924 (Dawes Plan). The 
harsh memory of hyperinflation (and the aim of bolstering confidence in German 
reparations payments) forced successive governments to tie the future of the nation to the 
gold standard as a safeguard against economic chaos. In this respect the economic 
historian Theo Balderston asserted that world financial markets drew a connection 
between the indiscipline of German fiscal politics and the gold standard regime, leaving 
the Reichsbank no room to finance the deficit. This in turn reinforced the government 
policy of expenditure cuts and tax increases from 1930 under the threat of Reich 
bankruptcy45. But in the turmoil of the Great Depression, deflation «provoked hunger 
marches and mass demonstrations» in the streets. Eichengreen and Temin detail how the 
government struggled to maintain the parity of the German currency in 1931 by reducing 
all prices by decree, half a year after having abandoned gold. Even the Socialists opposed 
monetary expansion at the time. All these policies led Germany to economic contraction, 
which for these authors would help the Nazis (who were against gold standard) to rise46. 
This argument would give credit to Polanyi’s thesis. 
Nonetheless, Germany was not the only country to turn to an authoritarian political 
system from 1920 to 1935. In his Notes on Sources in relation to Chapter 2, Polanyi lists 
the countries from Central and Eastern Europe in which a one-party government was 
established during the inter-war period: Estonia and Lithuania in 1926, Yugoslavia in 
1929, Austria, Bulgaria and Germany in 1933, and Latvia in 1934. Obviously, fascist Italy 
in southern Europe should be included in this list, and Portugal’s Estado Novo could also 
be added47. Here a question arises: given Polanyi’s direct link between gold standard and 
the rise of fascism, was the impact of deflation harder on those countries which finally 
embraced authoritarianism? 
The statistics compiled by the League of Nations in their Statistical Yearbooks allow 
us to study the changes in the retail price index (cost of living) in many countries 
throughout the 1921–1932 period. Table 1 shows the annual increase in retail prices in 
several European countries and the United States between 1921 and 1932. A classification 
has been made on the basis of the percentage of years with deflation, from highest to 
lowest, separate from the United States figures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
44 Ivi, p. 144. 
45 T. BALDERSTON, Economics and politics in the Weimar Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002, p. 97. 
46 B. EICHENGREEN, P. TEMIN, op. cit., pp. 202-205. 
47 The Falange Española fascist movement emerged in Spain under the wings of Italian fascism, but it had 
very little political support in the 1930s. Although they did have some relevance after the end of the Spanish 
Civil War, this was less than four months before the start of the Second World War. 
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Table 1. Evolution of annual cost of living in retail prices in Europe and USA, 1921–
1932 (index numbers, 1914:100). 
 
 
 
Source: League of Nations, Statistical Yearbooks, 1922-1933, own elaboration. 
 
If we match Polanyi’s list with the table, only two Baltic countries, Lithuania and 
Estonia, experienced deflation for more than half the analysed period. In all the other 
cases, price increases prevailed in the years of the period. That said, it could be argued 
for the sake of Polanyi’s thesis that severe deflation impacted those countries in the early 
thirties, but it is also true that many of them (Austria, Germany, Latvia) abandoned the 
gold standard in 1931. The one country that did retain the gold standard until 1934 was 
the one to show the highest percentage of years with deflation among the countries with 
a one-party regime, Italy. However, deflation in Italy was a product of fascism, 
(Mussolini’s commitment to the gold standard and an overvalued currency in the mid-
twenties) and not the other way around48. Nevertheless, Polanyi sees no contradiction 
between this fact and his thesis, though his justification may sound unconvincing. 
 
The antidemocratic philosophy of fascism was already born, but was not as yet a 
political factor. Trotsky gave a voluminous report on the situation in Italy on the eve 
of the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, but did not even mention fascism, 
although fasci had been in existence for some time. It took another ten years or more 
before Italian fascism, long since established in the government of the country, 
developed anything in the nature of a distinctive social system49. 
 
In short, Italian fascism did not really develop into a recognizably fascist regime until 
the 1930s, which helps Polanyi sustain his logical sequence of gold standard-deflation-
fascism. However, on reading Aldcroft’s explanation, we find the implication to be the 
                                               
48 The so called quota novanta meant a revaluation of the Lira, following «the Anglo-American-sponsored 
international capitalism of the gold-exchange standard. [...] as a tragic caricature of that system» (Charles 
S. MAIER, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the decade after 
World War I, Revised Edition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015, p. 577). 
49 K. POLANYI, The Great Transformation, cit., p. 251. 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 % Years deflation
Norway -7.7 -16.6 -5,6 9,6 1,7 -15,2 -9,7 -7,0 -4,0 -3,0 -5 -2.6 83,3
UK -9.2 -19 -4.9 0.6 0.6 -2.3 -2.3 -1.2 -1.2 -3.7 -7 -2.7 83,3
Sweden -8.2 -19.8 -10.1 1.7 1.7 -2.3 -1.2 0.6 -1.2 -2.9 -3.6 -1.9 83,3
Denmark -11.1 -13.8 3 4.9 -2.3 -12.8 -3.8 -1.1 -1.1 -4.6 -6.1 0,0 75,0
Holand -8.6 -9.9 -4.4 1.7 1.1 -6.1 0 0.6 -0.6 -4.2 -6.2 -6.6 66,7
Lithuania 23.6 11 -6.6 0 -2.8 -2.2 -14.2 -8.7 -16.2 66,7
Hungary -6 -6.4 8.8 5.4 0 -9.4 -4.7 -3 62,5
Switzerland -10.7 -18 0 3 -0.6 -3.6 -1.2 0.6 0 -1.9 -5.1 -8 58,3
Italy 22.4 -7.4 -1.4 6.7 15.9 7 -10.1 -9.9 2.8 -2.8 -8.5 -3.5 58,3
Finland -2.7 0.7 2 3.6 -2.4 2 2.2 -0.6 -7.8 -8 -1.3 54,5
Estonia 7.1 12.1 -7.8 13.8 -0.9 -0.9 6.7 4.5 -11.1 -3.8 -6 54,5
Spain -0.5 -4.2 -2.2 4 2.7 -1.1 1.1 -6.9 2.8 3.3 4.8 -4.6 50,0
Latvia 4.1 3.9 35 0.9 -1.8 -3.7 6.8 7.3 -14.4 -2 -7.1 45,5
Bulgaria 3.3 36.5 -5.4 14.4 6.4 -4.2 -3.4 4.4 2.9 -13.1 -18.5 0.8 41,7
Poland 21.2 101.6 15 21.9 -35.4 0 0.9 -6.9 -9.3 -8.2 40,0
Czechoslovakia 0.4 4.2 -1.1 4.3 0.1 -0.5 0.3 -4.4 37,5
Germany 17.4 331.4 -30.2 9.4 0.7 5 2.7 1.3 -4.5 -7.5 -11 36,4
Belgium -7 17.2 17.4 6.3 21.3 23 2.5 5.8 3.6 -10.5 -9.8 27,3
Romania 30.9 46.4 19.4 8.9 9.3 8.5 2.8 7.1 -0.9 -28.6 -16.4 27,3
France 12.8 10.5 8.4 26.3 1.8 1 7.1 4.5 -2.1 -7.6 20,0
Austria 95.1 2544.4 17.3 9.1 7.3 2.9 1.9 2.8 0 -4.5 1.9 9,1
USA -24.6 -7.2 2.8 0 7.5 2.5 -3.7 -0.6 1.9 -6.4 -17.7 -15.7 58,3
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contrary. Citing the article The 1927 Revaluation of the Lira: a Study in Political Economy 
by J.S. Cohen, Aldcroft argues that Mussolini was able to enforce a deflationary 
adjustment policy (which involved an increase of unemployment) in the late twenties with 
more freedom «than his counterparts in the pre-war parity countries’ because he had all 
the political authority of a one-party regime»50. In other words, his reasoning is that 
deflation did not pave the way for fascism, but rather that fascism paved the way for 
deflation. 
The results of the table raise other question with respect to the gold standard-deflation-
fascism causal link. Why did some countries with serious deflation problems both in the 
twenties and thirties manage to avoid authoritarian solutions? The Scandinavian countries 
(Sweden, in particular) offer us a very interesting point with regard to Polanyi’s thesis, 
but we will deal with this later. For the moment, we can start with the two classic examples 
of the steady decrease in prices associated with loyalty to the gold standard, Britain and 
the United States. With the exception of Norway, both nations actually recorded the 
highest average fall in retail prices between 1921 and 1932 of all the countries in Table 1 
(5.1 in the United States and 4.5 in the United Kingdom). 
Eichengreen and Temin focus their analysis on the effects of the gold standard 
mentality once the Great Depression became a reality in four cases, those of France, 
Germany, Britain and the United States. We have already discussed the German case, 
while France was late to deflation as it remained in the gold standard system (leading the 
creation of the so-called ‘gold bloc’) until 1936. Polanyi’s model seems to fit quite well 
in the light of Eichengreen and Temin’s description of the events in Britain and the United 
States, surrounding the commitment of those countries’ governments to gold standard-
imposed deflation levels which, in the context of a harsh crisis, were no longer accepted 
by workers and unions, and with serious political consequences51. Why did they not 
follow the German political path? Polanyi has one answer for both cases. 
The two prototypical liberal countries were able to save their democracies from 
collapsing along with the self-regulating markets in the 1930s, not mainly because they 
were «masters not servants of the currency»52, but rather because both abandoned the 
gold standard in time. According to Polanyi, the United States and Britain shared this 
common factor. A second answer gives a particular explanation to the limited success of 
fascism in Britain (and France): «its antipatriotism»53.  Unfortunately, as Polanyi does not 
go into detail in this matter, we have to concentrate on the shared factor. 
The United States was able to both reject laissez-faire and avoid any temptation 
authoritarianism might have at the same time through the New Deal, which was 
implemented in the same year the country went off the gold standard (1933). However, 
things were much more complicated in Britain. Polanyi stresses that leaving the gold 
standard in 1931 did not mean dispelling its mentality. We have already noted his 
conviction that Britain followed a policy of stable exchanges and sound currency that 
would prevent the nation from quickly rearming. Eichengreen and Temin delimit this gold 
mentality inertia to 1932 when the Bank of England was still reluctant to reduce interest 
rates under the fear of fostering inflation54. At any rate, Drummond says that «Britain 
                                               
50 D. ALDCROFT, op. cit., p. 152. 
51 B. EICHENGREEN, P. TEMIN, op. cit., pp. 192-193, 202. 
52 K. POLANYI, The Great Transformation, cit., p. 242. 
53 Ivi, p. 250. 
54 B. EICHENGREEN, P. TEMIN, op. cit., p. 203. 
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soon discovered that a floating currency had its advantages»55. Consequently, by the 
summer of 1932 Britain had circumscribed its commitment to stable exchange rates to 
the Empire, while the pound would float for the rest of the world, leaving the Bank of 
England free to implement an inflationary policy. In the end, Britain’s gold standard 
mentality seemed to have lasted barely one year. 
Precisely, 1932 saw the peak of the biggest problem encountered by Britain in the 
entire inter-war period, unemployment. After 1921 the unemployment rate was never 
below 10 per cent of the working population, and it would exceed 20 per cent in 1931 and 
1932. It was not until 1934 that unemployment began to decrease steadily, but the crisis 
had left deep wounds in the labour market. Long-term unemployment, which was around 
five per cent in 1929, reached twenty-two per cent between 1933 and 1937. In turn, this 
economic instability would also affect the political scene. The Labour Party government 
fell after barely two years in power, deeply affected by the sterling crisis of the summer 
of 1931. A National Government was formed comprising members of the Labour, 
Conservative and Liberal parties, with strong opposition from unions and the Labour 
party itself, which went so far as to expel the First Labour Party prime minister, Ramsay 
McDonald. 
In such economic and political circumstances, it is not surprising that Brenton 
Priestley, in his analysis of the failure of fascism in inter-war Britain, writes: 
 
The British political climate was as opportune as it would ever be for a Fascist party 
to seize power; people were searching for leaders who stood for national interests 
and who had the power to remedy the ailing economy and political system56. 
 
In October 1932 Oswald Mosley, a high-profile figure in Britain after the Great War57, 
founded the British Union of Fascists (BUF), influenced by what he had seen in Italy 
earlier that year. Initially a more left-wing politician, he embraced fascism convinced that 
the corporate state he saw in Italy would be the best way to bring prosperity and order 
back to Britain. 
The BUF was an authoritarian and nationalistic movement. This seems to give little 
credit to Polanyi’s claim that British fascism had little importance owing to its anti-
patriotism. In fact, the nationalist approach was a dominant factor in the short-lived 
success of the Blackshirts. In June 1934 the BUF reached 50,000 members, when only a 
year and a half before there were 10,000. According to Priestley, the movement’s 
downfall was due to a combination of a legislative offensive by the National Government 
and the party’s espousal of anti-Semitic views. Nevertheless, he points out, that anti-
Semitism was just an attempt to draw attention when it was realized that fascism was 
                                               
55 I.M. DRUMMOND, op. cit., 49. 
56 B. PRIESTLEY, Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists: Destined to failure?, 2000, 
www.brentonpriestley.com 
57 A young MP in the 1920s, his 1925 book Revolution by Reason denied the sacrosanct relationship 
between extra purchasing power (through credit to the consumers) and inflation, at least in the severe 
situation of unemployment Britain was experiencing. In other words, Mosley was advocating a managed 
currency just as the country was about to return to the discipline imposed by the gold standard. Everybody 
ignored it. Five years later, as a member of the Labour government, he made several proposals concerning 
unemployment, including the so-called ‘Mosley Memorandum’. He proposed high tariffs, nationalization 
of industries and a plan of public works. Once more, he was ignored, and he resigned his ministerial position 
and left the Labour Party to form one of his own. 
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increasingly losing its appeal as the threat of economic chaos and Communism receded58. 
Finally, liberal democracy proved to have a more solid basis in Britain than on the 
Continent  
After all, if Britain was able to evade the peril of an authoritarian solution, it was due 
more to political and social factors, while economic (or monetary) issues seemed to play 
a secondary role. Polanyi himself expressed this idea in the early thirties. In an article for 
the previously mentioned Der Österreichische Volkswirt magazine, he talks about the 
philosophical ligation of democracy in the Anglo-Saxon countries, due to their Puritan 
background, a political culture those European countries which turned into dictatorships 
lacked59.  
At this point it is pertinent to ask to what extent fascism in inter-war Europe was the 
product of economic factors. Once again, history and sociology have already provided us 
with some answers. 
 
 
Failure of economic liberalism, crisis and the rise of fascism 
 
As we have previously expounded, Polanyi establishes a direct link between the failure 
of economic liberalism and the fall of several democracies in inter-war Europe. And 
though Polanyi frequently uses the word ‘authoritarian’ to describe the anti-democratic 
governments that spread all over Europe after the First World War, the last two chapters 
of the book (20 and 21) make no mistake about what he was referring to by this: fascism. 
Fascists were able to rule all across Europe because they emerged as ‘an alternative 
solution of the problem of industrial society’ (2001: 252), i.e. the ruinous condition of the 
free market system after the crash of 1929. 
What do historians have to say about this particular issue, the economic factor behind 
fascism? To begin with, some answers can be found in the book by Michael Mann, 
Fascists (2004), because the author explicitly enquires into this subject. In particular, he 
revises different theories that have explained fascism through the economic factor. One 
set of those theories concentrates on the effect of the Great Depression. Thus, Mann 
studies whether the authoritarian coups d’état were preceded by a strong recession. He 
admits that this could be the case in many of the countries Polanyi mentioned in his end 
notes: Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany and Lithuania. Even 1919-1922 Italy could fit 
into those theories. Nevertheless, he points out that there is a different regional pattern 
between the north of Europe on the one hand, and the centre, east and south of the 
Continent on the other: all suffered from the crisis, but only in the second group was 
democracy replaced by authoritarian (and fascist) governments. Given that it is not 
possible to explain those differences based on economic factors alone, he concludes that 
economic difficulties were never decisive in the rise of the fascists60. 
If we accept this description, the emphasis on a conflict between economic classes 
worsened by the crisis would place Polanyi among the group Mann calls the «theorists of 
the capitalist class»61. For them, as well as for Polanyi, the fear of a socialist revolution 
by unions and labour parties would have made capitalists prone to authoritarian solutions. 
When people on the political right felt that both private property and social order may 
                                               
58 B. PRIESTLEY, op. cit. 
59 K. POLANYI, Wirtschaft un Demokratie, cit. 
60 M. MANN, Fascists, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 58. 
61 Ivi, p. 59. 
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have been threatened, nationalism, statism and militarism were the ideologies they found 
to defend those principles. In so far as fascism sustained all those ideologies, the capitalist 
and conservative classes would have given their support to anti-democratic groups. 
Nonetheless, Mann notes that «the most ambitious type of economic explanation could 
be only a partial, not a total, explanation» of fascism62. His thesis makes reference to four 
interconnected crises in the inter-war period: military, economic, political and ideological. 
Without these crises and the Great War that caused them, fascism would never have 
become a mass movement, he claims. In line with the idea expressed by Polanyi in the 
thirties, the way countries responded to the crises (including high inflation in the 1920s 
and the Great Depression in the 1930s, both capable of destabilizing governments) was 
different in those with a liberal democratic tradition compared to the «dual» states («half 
liberal democratic, half authoritarian»). In the first group of countries (north and west of 
Europe), crises prompted populist parties to search for solutions within the rules of 
democracy, while in the second group (in the centre, east and south of the Continent), the 
conservatives used the authoritarian half of the state, the army and the police, as a way of 
popular repression, «reducing or overturning the power of the state’s parliamentary half». 
Fascism would eventually take advantage of the willingness of «authoritarian rightists» 
to explore more radical solutions in a context of growing nationalism and 
paramilitarism63.  
In contrast with Polanyi, Mann does not think of fascism as a product of the failure of 
liberalism, but rather «a product of a sudden, half-baked attempt at liberalization amid 
social crises»64. Since the defects of liberalism and the Great Depression, he states, 
affected the whole continent, it would not be correct to link them with fascism, given that 
half of Europe was able to avoid that authoritarian solution. Obviously, Mann understands 
liberalism more from a political perspective, and it is true that the crisis was unable to 
bring down institutionalized liberal systems. By the same token, he says that those liberal 
democracies that did survive had been able to develop economic strategies (the New Deal 
in the United States, social democracy in Scandinavia, splitting the Labour Party in 
Britain) to protect capitalism in the way, he notes, proposed by Keynes65. Therefore, it 
could be said that wherever liberal democracy rode out the crisis in the 1930s, it was 
through the abandonment of liberal economy, and thus giving credit to Polanyi’s thesis. 
Another reference work on this subject, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy by 
Gregory M. Luebbert, supports Polanyi’s view regarding the clash between politics and 
economics.  The failure of liberalism prior to the victory of fascism did not necessarily 
mean the end of representative democracy, as long as it fulfilled the labour movements’ 
demand that politics were to replace markets in the handling of the economy. Certain 
countries (France, Britain and Switzerland) presented an alliance between the liberal 
bourgeoisie and the workers’ movement before 1914 that prevented the latter from 
defying the liberal order in the inter-war period. Other countries failed to develop such 
alliances as a result of the inability of liberalism to gather enough support from the 
bourgeoisie. Those countries finally turned into social democracies or fascist 
dictatorships66.  
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Contrary to Polanyi’s opinion, Luebbert sees no causal link between economic crisis 
and the rise of fascism from the perspective of compared history. Neither high inflation 
nor deflation offer explanations applicable to all the cases, he says. Rather, the causes of 
fascism would lie in the political field, as those described above67. However, it may be 
that the link between recession and fascism still worked for individual examples, which 
is why mention must be made of the main European fascist countries highlighted by 
Polanyi (Italy, Germany and Austria). 
The inter-war years in Italy were characterized by economic difficulties and social 
turmoil. The historian Vera Zamagni accounts for all these problems in the so called 
Biennio Rosso or ‘two red years’ (1919-1920). Controls on foodstuffs imposed during the 
war, including rationing, lasted until the middle of 1921. The middle classes saw their 
income diminished due to high inflation, while unemployment grew steadily until 1921. 
At the same time, class conflict gained intensity through popular revolts (1919), strikes 
(1919-1920 especially) and factory occupations (1920). Nevertheless, Zamagni does not 
necessary link these events with Mussolini’s rise to power. Instead, she believes the main 
reason to be «the inability of political parties to form a stable government»68. 
The American historian Charles S. Maier, in his work on interwar stabilization in 
Europe, states that historians have «perhaps overstressed the relative distress of the lower 
middle class in Italy […] especially […] the recession of late 1920 and 1921 […] seem 
less agonizing a social problem in Italy than in Germany from 1919 to 1933»69. Citing 
Italian commentators on fascism such as Missiroli or Renzo De Felice, Maier regards 
wartime inflation a relevant factor in the understand of why impoverished urban middle 
classes embraced fascism. In any event, he concludes that the victory of fascists was the 
product of «a socio-political continuum between town and countryside» in some 
particular Italian regions, where political instability and the incapacity of liberalism eased 
the way for Mussolini’s black shirts70. 
In his chapter devoted to Italian fascism (the ‘Pristine Fascists’), Michael Mann also 
refers to the economic factor. For him: «the economic problem was less one of recession 
than of the postwar class conflict»71. Class confrontation in Italy after the Great War 
involved not only employers versus employees but also rural landowners versus peasants. 
The fascists presented themselves as the solution to overcoming class conflicts, through 
nation-statism, attracting the favour of capitalists. Mann reflects on the reason for Italian 
capitalists rejecting Giolitti’s reforms and embracing fascism, and he sees other causes 
besides economic ones. Thus, Mussolini took advantage of the Italian political crisis by 
flying the flag of nationalism and statism to attract the economic elites. In the end, he 
concludes that fascism in Italy was a product of the First World War, with one of its best 
representations being the paramilitary militancy in the fasci di combattimento of many 
young men demobilized after the war72. 
Luebbert’s interpretation is in line with those made by Zamagni, Maier, and Mann. His 
view was that the economic factor played no part in the rise of Mussolini. In fact, he 
points out that Italian output grew at eleven per cent between 1919 and 1923. The failure 
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of liberalism in Italy was clearly a political issue. The American author revises all the 
political changes Italy experienced in the decade prior to the Marcia su Roma in October 
1922. The failure to achieve liberal stabilization through political alliances gave room to 
Mussolini’s radical solution, which had little support in the elections of 1919 and 1921. 
He notes that the inability of the successive governments to restore order in the cities and 
in the countryside helped Mussolini to come to power73.  
Therefore, it seems that the economic distress was not a determining factor in Italy. On 
the contrary, some scholars have observed a strong relationship between the Depression 
and the rise of Nazism in Germany. In particular, William Brustein supports this thesis in 
his book The Logic of Evil. If under three per cent of the electorate voted for the Nazis in 
1928, and they were able to become the largest party in the 1932 elections with 37 per 
cent of the vote, the difference was the economic crisis. Many Germans perceived the 
Nazis to offer much better solutions to overcome the effects of the Great Depression than 
the other political options did74. 
Michael Mann discusses Brustein’s conclusion, among his other economic arguments. 
Mann studies Nazi support (and militancy) by the economic classes, and finds that 
‘economic success thus helps to explain Nazism more than does deprivation’. In this 
regard, he notes that the Nazis became the major party of the radical right even before the 
Depression hit the German economy. Nonetheless, he agrees with other scholars in that 
«if there had been no Great Depression, there would have been no Nazi regime», because 
the economic crisis marked the end of the Weimar democracy. Consequently, «the core 
truth of economic explanations of Nazism», as Mann himself concludes, would be that 
Nazism was there before the 1930s crisis, but the crisis was a necessary determinant that 
brought it to power. He saw this as necessary but not sufficient, because «Germany was 
not in chaos», and economic recession was nothing that a democracy could not handle. 
This is why Mann concludes there were «other causes besides economic crisis» to 
consider, in particular the political weakness of the Weimar regime75. Once again, the 
failure of liberalism would have been more a political than an economic issue. 
Charles S. Maier interpretation seems to be in line with Mann. Maier considers 
economic distress in the 1920s, inflation in particular, as a factor that first eroded rents 
and then radicalized the middle class in Germany. But he adds that it is also true that other 
groups (such as farmers) supported the Nazis when their debts had been liquidated as 
early as in 1923. Finally, in the context of deflation during the early 1930s, mass 
unemployment and the perceived inability of democratic political leaders to overcome it 
proved to be decisive for the end of Weimar’s democracy. Nevertheless, he also stresses 
that the corporatist organization of German society was key to bringing together different 
economic groups under the same radical right-wing political response76. Here too, 
political causes interact with economic causes to explain the victory of fascism in 
Germany. 
Economic history has also reviewed the debate over the impact of the economic 
downturn on Hitler’s political success. Balderston deals with the possible link between 
Brüning’s policy of deflation and Nazism. Labelled the ‘hunger chancellor’, Heinrich 
Brüning was the head of the German government from 30 March 1930 to 30 May 1932, 
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a period in which the country saw unemployment rise to 6 million. His deflationist policy 
is believed by many to have caused misery, therefore creating a propitious atmosphere for 
the Nazis, a belief Polanyi had supported77. 
In any event, Balderston adds some political nuances: for example, when the 
chancellor dissolved the Reichstag and called the election (September 1930) in which the 
Nazis gained 105 seats, Hindenburg had his share of the blame by appointing Brüning so 
as not to depend on the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to pass his decrees. What is more, 
the SPD tolerated many of the measures implemented by Brüning’s restrictive policy, and 
there was no support at the time for reflation in the Reichstag. The author points out that 
the problem was more political: the Brüning government was not seen by the German 
people as putting crisis management ahead of a balanced budget and reparations 
payments, which played into the hands of the Nazis and their anti-system strategy78.  
The economic review by Balderston offers us an interesting conclusion: the Nazi vote 
showed high sensitivity to the crisis. However, the Nazis came to power as the economic 
context was improving. June 1932 marked the end of reparations for Germany, and Von 
Papen’s public works scheme achieved recovery in employment by the end of 1932. In 
this sense, the final elections of March 1933 did not respond well to that sensitivity to 
crisis79. But that was obviously after the Reichstag fire.  
Finally, we have already seen Luebbert’s contrary opinion on the rise of fascism as a 
consequence of the dynamics of the economy. This naturally includes the Great 
Depression. In particular, he states that the economic crisis cannot explain the success of 
Nazism. However, what for him is a key element, the support given by the rural 
bourgeoisie to Hitler, he considers to be somewhat economically motivated. He asserts 
that the Nazi Party was nothing more than a group of fanatics with no social roots until 
neither socialists nor liberals were able to solve agrarian misery. Deflation depleted 
agrarian revenues in the 1930s and led the landowners to advise their party (the 
Zentrumspartei or Centrists) to support the Nazis80. Again, an unstable economy 
somehow helped the Nazis. 
While there is doubt as to whether the economic situation was crucial for Nazis on 
their road to power, it seems to have played a determining role in Austria. Michael Mann 
states that economic recession and fascism correlate quite well in inter-war Austria. What 
is more, «economic crisis was a major factor in the collapse of the republic and especially 
in the Nazi seizure of power». For many Austrians, integration with Germany was the 
best way to fight unemployment, as the Nazis had successfully done in their neighbouring 
country. The Great Depression had actually hit harder and lasted longer in Austria, but it 
is also true that Hitler’s blockade of the Austrian economy had contributed to this 
situation81. 
Nonetheless, Mann makes some observations on the economic factor. German 
nationalism already existed when the economy begun to worsen in Austria, and mass 
unemployment did not turn many Austrians towards Nazi militancy. Given that the 
paramilitary variable was as important there as in Germany or Italy, the author concludes 
that other factors, apart from the economy, have to be considered to explain the Austrian 
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case, particularly that of being an «ethnic German» country82. 
According to Luebbert, the influence of Germany was decisive in the failure of 
Austrian parliamentary system. Thus, liberalism failed in Austria both during the late part 
of the empire and in the 1930s as the result of the country’s international situation. On the 
contrary, he sees no link between the Great Depression and fascism in Austria. His point 
is that the economic downturn was as bad as it was in Germany, but in terms of electorate 
(he takes the local and regional elections of 1932 as his example) the Nazis had only 
minimum support, and in spite of extreme inflation in the 1920s and harsh recession, 
Austria only became a fascist nation after the Anschluss of 193883. Here an important 
difference between Mann and Luebbert should be noted: the latter considered the philo-
fascist Dollfuss regime of (1932–1934) a traditional dictatorship. 
In summary, the link between economic distress and the rise of fascism in the 1930s 
was not the general rule in Europe. In reference to the main countries, it did not occur that 
way in Italy; it presented objections in Germany; while Austria seems to be the case with 
the best fit to that causal link. In any event, Polanyi’s general consideration that market 
liberalism was followed in the 1930s by interventionist governments everywhere 
(whether authoritarian or not) is a fact that leads us to one final and important thought. 
 
 
The overlooked Scandinavian model of social democracy in the 1930s 
 
The deflation/inflation table shows that among the most highly ranked of the countries 
that suffered from deflation during the inter-war years were the Scandinavian countries 
of Norway, Sweden and Denmark.  It is worth noting here that Sweden was one of the 
few countries (along with the United States, the Netherlands and some Latin American 
countries) to restore the gold standard in its full pre-1914 version. Swedish income and 
output felt twice as much in 1920-1922 than it did in the aftermath of the 1929 crash. 
Unemployment throughout the decade averaged 14.2 per cent in Sweden and 16.8 per 
cent in Norway. Apart from Germany, the countries that experienced the most severe 
strike activity in inter-war Europe were Norway and Sweden. Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that real wages grew above industrial output and real GDP in the Scandinavian 
countries. Those three elements (high unemployment, intense strike activity and quick 
real wages increase) were a challenge for Sweden and Norway’s democracies as much as 
they were in Germany and Austria. In this regard, Luebbert’s conclusion seems to be in 
line with Polanyi’s proposition about the failure of liberalism. That failure did not prevent 
democracy from succeeding84. The basic condition was that politics had to substitute 
markets, exactly the point that Polanyi highlights in his book. And this is what happened 
through social democracy. 
Following Polanyi’s argumentation, the Social Democrats in Norway and Sweden 
achieved their economic goals through monetary expansion even more than they could 
through fiscal policy. Shortly after leaving the gold standard (1931, the same year that 
Britain left) social democracy broke with orthodoxy, issuing millions of crowns into their 
economies. Along with a fiscal policy of public works funded through higher taxes on the 
urban bourgeoisie, the Social Democrats created expectations of economic recovery in 
the 1930s. After the Social Democrats came to power in 1932, social democracy was 
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consolidated in Sweden after the 1936 elections, and the Saltsjöbaden Pact of 1938 
imposed a full employment programme on Swedish capitalists. The role of the state was 
to promote economic growth and centralized collective bargaining, and in return, private 
control was guaranteed for capital markets, firms and property85. Like fascism, those 
measures meant a break with economic liberalism, but unlike fascism, social democracy 
survived the war and the model, expanded to all the Nordic countries, reached its maturity 
in the 1950s. 
Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol studied Sweden’s ‘new deal’, comparing it with the 
cases of Britain and the United States as a kind of Keynesian response to the Great 
Depression. They regarded Sweden as the world’s first ever full-employment welfare 
state. Like Luebbert, these sociologists and political scientists find the root of the ‘social 
democracy recovery strategy’ in 1920s Sweden. The long tradition of a centralized state 
eased the way for public intervention and spending, even for the Liberals before 1932. It 
allowed the Social Democrats to finance extensive public works without having to trigger 
inflation and promote exports. At the same time, the role of Swedish economists (the so-
called Stockholm School) in influencing recovery policies with state-sponsored reforms 
would have been even greater than that of Keynes in Britain. Ironically enough, Sweden 
was where «the earliest and fullest “Keynesian” policy successes» were achieved86. 
After all, what these authors are stressing could be summarized in this way: while 
fascism in Europe and the New Deal in the United States have attracted attention as 
paradigmatic examples of the rupture with laissez-faire economics in the 1930s, there was 
another response that was equally (if not more) successful and was destined to last a long 
time. Why did Polanyi overlook the Scandinavian (particularly the Swedish) case as a 
major example of his own thesis? No plausible explanation seems to justify why Polanyi 
did not write a single line about Sweden or Norway in the 1930s. And this neglect does 
not only apply to his most popular work. In his 1947 essay, Our Obsolete Market 
Mentality, Polanyi named several countries in which liberalism was being discarded. 
Among them were American New Dealers, European fascists and British Social-
Democrats (sic), but no reference is made to the Scandinavian experience87.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Great Transformation was Karl Polanyi’s chief intellectual achievement. His 
historical account of the difficult times Europe (and the United States) experienced 
between the two world wars had the virtue of being understood in a broader perspective, 
the rise and fall of market liberalism. Polanyi was also a pioneer in blaming the gold 
standard mentality for the persistence of the Great Depression into the 1930s. As we have 
seen, economic historians who have studied the gold standard and the Great Depression 
would also stress this link many decades later.  
However, Polanyi’s desire to sustain his thesis that the Great Depression marked the 
end of one hundred years of market economy, made him picture the gold standard as 
something that ceased to exist after the Great War: the last bastion of market liberalism. 
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The gold standard was never the same after 1914, and though it was only in the 1930s 
when the system collapsed, the essence of an economic device independent of political 
intervention (represented by servomechanisms), was already a thing of the past in 1919. 
The second part of his thesis, that the end of market liberalism also brought down 
liberal democracy in many European countries is more debatable. The gold standard-
deflation-authoritarian regime link does not seem to have operated that way, and Polanyi 
himself may have changed his initial emphasis from inflation to deflation. Of the three 
paradigmatic fascists regimes of the thirties, Nazism does not seem to be the direct result 
of economic crisis, although it certainly helped Hitler in his bid for power; fascism in 
Italy had no connection with that link; only Austria seemed to present economic reasons 
for the rise of fascist solutions, but it is also true that its condition as Germany’s neighbour 
had much to do with it. In any event, historical sociology understands the rise of fascism 
in Europe through more complex mechanisms, and explains the continuity/fall of liberal 
democracy more in terms of the political agreements (liberal parties, workers) that were 
respectively present and absent prior to 1914. 
Finally, some countries did share membership of the gold standard, harsh deflation in 
the 1920s and the final implementation of an economic response to the crisis that was 
even further from laissez-faire than it was from the New Deal: Scandinavian social 
democracy. Polanyi neglected to mention the cases of Sweden and Norway in his 
historical account, and we have no clue as to why he did so. Perhaps he saw social 
democracy as a rebuttal of his main thesis, as seen in his statement: ‘Inevitably, society 
took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took impaired the self-regulation 
of the market, disorganized industrial life and thus endangered society in yet another way’ 
(2001: 4). On the contrary, what social democracy did was to protect business from the 
recession and promote industry in their countries. And its success marked the path many 
western countries would take after the Second World War.  
By the time The Great Transformation was reissued as a paperback in 1957, the 
developed world experienced the rise of mixed economies everywhere. The so-called 
Golden Age of Capitalism was also known as the Age of Keynes, three decades of market 
intervention, welfare states and economic growth under the international monetary 
system created in Bretton Woods. There would be no sign of self-regulating markets until 
1980, and no sign of fascism in Europe. But apparently, all those realities were not strong 
enough to make Polanyi reconsider some of his ideas, as if he were still writing in the 
first half of the 1940s. 
 
